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CHAPTER 1 
Selves and identities 
I first came to the ideas of Gabriel Garcia Márquez in his novel One 
Hundred Years of Solitude. There Márquez described the dangers of 
isolation for a family that cannot (or will not) escape their own self-
inflicted misfortunes. In Love inand the Time of Cholera, Márquez 
revisited the theme of the iterative nature of history, death and rebirth, and 
pondered the power of relationships in sickness and health. The novel is 
about the intimacies of a relationship and the consequences of rejection 
and inequality, but also challenges us to question the facades and personal 
identities created and recreated by the characters in the novel. It is about 
the process of ‘continuing to become.’. 
Much of what follows in this book is also about relationships, how we 
see ourselves and how we are perceived by others. How we are identified 
by others and how we identify ourselves are not necessarily congruent but 
both are integral to the discourses we hold with ourselves and others; they 
are part of the vernacular and both are yoked to the culture of individuality 
that is so pervasive in many societies. In Wwesternised societies, we are 
encouraged in various ways to see ourselves as unique. We talk, for 
instance, of someone who is ‘uniquely qualified’ for a particular role. We 
laud the individual who outcompetes the others and wins the prize. This 
sense of uniqueness and the identities we adopt can, I suggest, blind us to 
our common humanity. It is this disregard for each other’s humanity that I 
want to question and investigate as part of my concerns about a societal 
fulcrum: education and educational processes. 
As indicated in the Introduction, my main aim in this book is to raise 
awareness of psychological factors that may be harmful to education. To 
do this, I need to pay attention to the context for education and the beliefs 
of those who, by virtue of their profession, identify themselves, or are 
identified by others, as ‘educators’ or ‘teachers’. This entails thinking 
about the nature of professional identity and how that is constructed. In 
this chapter, however, I examine general notions of ‘self’ and ‘identity’; 
what are some of the possible consequences of such conceptualisations; 
and how ‘identities’ may be formed. In doing so, I also examine some of 
  
the illusions (or myths) we have about, first, our notionally distinctive 
‘selves’; and, second, the relationship between our identity (our sense of 
individual personhood), and others in social groups that we may (or may 
not) be perceived to be in; and, last, what we can, morally and ethically do 
in light of such considerations. This leads me to consider both how identity 
is both socially constructed and socially formative, and the scope of 
individual identity and autonomy. This latter involves considering what 
autonomy and responsibilities we believe we have – that we take for 
granted – or perhaps, realistically, recognise as being limited. Some of 
these considerations will be based on philosophical work; some will be 
conceptually or empirically psychological in nature. I will discuss the 
nature of teachers’ professional identities and some of the factors that 
shape these in a subsequent chapter. In this chapter, however, I also suggest 
that identities as our observable or conceptualised characteristics, 
epiphenomena, can also be misleading or prejudicial. 
1.1 General notions of self and identity 
For the purposes of what follows, I will attempt to discriminate 
consistently between ‘the self’ and ‘identity’ (following Gerson, 2014). 
The former, almost tautologically entails consideration about what one 
believes about one’s ‘self’ for one’s self’s sake (and one’s beliefs about 
related concepts such as self-interests, self-efficacy and self-esteem). But 
when talking about one’s self caution is needed: 
‘The point is not to know whether I speak of myself in a way 
that conforms to what I am, but rather to know whether, when I 
speak of myself, I am the same as the self of whom I speak.’ 
(Lacan & Fink, 2006, p. 430) 
While ‘identity’ may be used synonymously with ‘self’ in much of the 
relevant literature, here I will mostly use identity to mean how one wishes 
to appear to others and how one is identified by others. However, since, as 
far as is known, neither self nor identity consists in any distinctive 
material, neural, component of the brain.1 Both self and identity (as simple 
constructions of our embodied minds) are used variously as philosophical, 
psychological and sociological devices to help delineate and understand 
human behaviour and mentalisation as epiphenomena or emergent 
properties of brain activity. But, while I am convinced by arguments such 
as those presented by Derek Parfit that both our physical and psychological 
features depend partly on the states of our brains (see Parfit, 1984, p. 237), 
I do not subscribe to a crude reductionist views of human behaviour. 
Further, since we are typically never totally isolated from all external 
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physical and social environments (including the environments of 
ourselves), it is, therefore, (thanks to Simon’s ant) ultimately only possible 
to study these epiphenomena and their purportedly correlated behaviours 
in the contexts of the environments in which they are situated, constructed 
and construed (Simon, 1996). Importantly for what follows, I must note 
that in a series of thought experiments Parfit showed that an individual’s 
identity cannot be fully determined, except arbitrarily. Parfit rejected the 
plausibility of the argument put forward by some who: 
‘. . . believe that the identity of everything must always be 
determinate. These people accept a strict form of the doctrine 
no entity without identity. This is the claim that we cannot refer 
to a particular object, or name this object, unless our criterion of 
identity yields a definite answer in every conceivable case. On 
this view, we often mistakenly believe we are referring to some 
object, when, because there is no such criterion of identity, 
there is no object.’ 
(Parfit, 1984, p. 240) 
It seems to me that this argument, particularly when applied in the domain 
of human existence and inter-relationships, is another way of guarding 
against the essentialisation or objectification of persons that is a critical 
problem in the current state of education. I discuss some of this (and more 
of Parfit’s work) in the next sections but will return to it in greater detail 
in a later chapter. 
1.1.1 Objections to objectification 
Despite reasoned arguments such as Parfit’s (above), the construction of 
both ‘self’ and ‘identity’ continue to be objectified by authors and 
practitioners. Thus, for example, Michael Gerson, seeking to promote a 
role for neuroscience in complementing psychoanalytic approaches to 
‘self’ and ‘identity’, appears to have suggested that objectification is at 
least partially possible: 
‘Self as a source of knowledge and percept suggests a Jamesian 
subjective being, whereas self as a narrative and interpreter 
suggests an objectified reflection . . . The use of language to 
speak about one’s self, especially in comparison to others, 
forms an objectified frame of reference separate from the 
‘“being’” of self.’ 
(Gerson, 2014, p. 215) 
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Some of this may be an artefact of the limitations of language (and space) 
in Journal papers, but exemplifies how easy it can be to slip into the old 
habits of positivism. 
Likewise, in the social and political, psychological environments of 
education, concepts such as ‘identity’ and ‘self’ are, I suggest, easily 
misused by being objectified. Neither concept is essentially a natural 
category (or kind) that has distinct, bounded and immutable qualities (in 
the way that we see ‘ant’ as distinct from ‘diamond’, for example). If, for 
example, I am identified as a ‘vegetarian’, how distinctly and immutably 
different am I as far as you are concerned? Nick Haslam and his colleagues 
have investigated the issue of social categorisation in depth and mapped 
out the stigmatiszing effects of essentialist beliefs about social categories. 
Haslam has also challenged the hegemony of medical classification of 
mental health. Given the incursions of medicalising children’s apparent 
difficulties (for instance, in terms of behaviour and concentration that is 
too readily diagnosed as ‘Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder’), it is 
worth noting here what he has said. Having provided a rigorous critique of 
notions of psychiatric, mental-health conditions, he concluded that: 
‘the adverse consequences of essentialist thinking about mental 
disorders among laypeople are another neglected reason to be 
wary of these ways of conceptualizing psychiatric phenomena. 
Understandings of mental disorders as natural kinds with 
biogenetic essences that originate in professional discourse may 
spread into everyday language and thought, often in a 
vulgarized form, and there is now considerable evidence that 
the implications for lay conceptions of mental disorders are 
troubling. 
(Haslam, 2014, p. 23)’2 
The objectification or essentialising of personhood is ethically objectional 
and practically risky. Insensate things (for instance, diamonds) may have 
objective ‘identities’ that are unchangeable, universally defined and for 
everforever recognised. Human beings are not like that. We are not as 
different from each other as, for instance, gold and ant are, or even as tiger 
and lion are. We are diverse in our superficial characteristics, our traditions 
and languages, but we share a common genetic heritage and a common 
humanity, and can communicate empathically. 
One of the consequences that I think follows from taking an essentialist 
and reductionist view of identity (aside from categorisation and 
stereotyping) is that it suggests there lies an ultimate causal origin behind 
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the identity. Some sort of homunculus, perhaps. It seems to me that such 
an approach is both theoretically and practically problematic. Jacques 
Derrida sought to challenge this by posing the conundrum: ‘Must not the 
structure have a genesis, and must not the origin, the point of genesis, be 
already structured, in order to be the genesis of something?’ (Roy, 2010, 
p. 176; emphasis in the original.) The solution, for Derrida (and others 
drawing from the well of phenomenology first tapped by Hegel (1977)3), 
was to construct identity in terms of differences. Just as we notice 
something most quickly when, for instance, a bird that has been 
camouflaged by the leaves in a hedge flies up, so we distinguish identities 
by comparison with what they differ from, what they are not. Ultimately, 
this is a relationship with ‘otherness’ (that which I address in detail in 
Cchapter 2). Edward Sampson used this deconstruction of essentialism as 
cornerstone of his relational view of identity. Sampson also drew on 
Derrida in saying: 
‘The essential reality of a given object can appear only by 
virtue of the unstated other that is necessary for the object’s 
identity to appear as such. In short, otherness is the basis for all 
identity, thereby undoing the essentialist view of identity and 
requiring that each identity be understood in terms of 
differences.’ 
(Sampson, 2008, p. 90) 
As I will show in Cchapter 2 with reference to the work of Lacan and 
Levinas, we are primarily defined by our difference from the Other but 
refract different differences from each other (including ourselves) that we 
encounter day by day. 
1.1.2 Self- interest 
From time to time, some of us are plagued by inter-related questions along 
the lines of ‘who (or what) am I’, ‘what’s my role (or job)’, ‘what should 
I do here’? Derek Parfit posed and examined the key issue more elegantly 
and precisely by presenting the issue thus: ‘Many of us want to know what 
we have most reason to do.’ (Parfit, 1984, p. 3). For very many teachers 
working in the educational systems of Wwestern jurisdictions, these 
questions deserve to become the focus of pertinent and worrying concerns 
about the role of education and educators’ professional identities.4 
Also implicit in these questions is the notion that there is a personal and 
autonomous self – a phenomenal self that has to be discovered or revealed 
and play its part in our personal development. In the Wwestern judeo-
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christianJudeo-Christian and greekGreek philosophical traditions of 
thought, it is commonplace to believe that the self is persistent and 
unchanging, and that we are, at least partially, but more likely, 
predominately self-interested, making as sure as possible that we, 
ourselves, are each ok. (That is to say I will look after myself; you look 
after yourself. I’ll be too busy looking after myself to look after you.) 
These beliefs are associated with trying to do what we can to make our 
personal situation as good as it may be (or at least to do what is necessary 
to personally survive). It is, accordingly, evident in many aspects of 
Wwestern cultures that we each behave in ways that are motivated by 
seeking to feel as good as we can about ourselves as individuals.5 Thus, 
when things are going well we seek achievements that reinforce a sense of 
well-being that we have autonomously achieved through our own efforts 
and agency. (The tautologies here are deliberate to set the agenda for what 
follows.) Western cultures offer us innumerable material rewards, to give 
us a sense of physical comfort for apparently minimal effort (‘buy now, 
pay later’). Most of us will also find affirmation of who we are, who we 
are regarded as being, through membership of groups – at work as well as 
in social and family settings. As I will discuss later, we tend to choose to 
join the groups that we can best identify with and best resonate and 
reinforce our beliefs in our selves. 
As I will also show, an answer to the question about ‘who we are’ is 
related to not only ‘where we are’ but more importantly ‘who we are with’, 
and perhaps most importantly, ‘how we are’. Who we are with, what 
society we are in, provides many of the constraints and affordances on who 
we can be, what we can responsibly do, and what role we have in specific 
circumstances. We are continuously evolving, but it is not possible to 
prove that we are distinct identities. For, as Parfit suggested: 
‘Because we ascribe thoughts to thinkers, we can truly claim 
that thinkers exist. But we cannot deduce, from the content of 
our experiences, that a thinker is a separately existing entity. 
And . . . because we are not separately existing entities, we 
could fully describe our thoughts without claiming that they 
that they are had by a subject of experiences.’ 
(Parfit, 1984, p. 225) 
The line of argument that because I perceive there to be psychological 
continuity for myself (an overlapping chain of memories of what I did the 
day before and some recall of who I was with and what I did, when I had 
some memory of who I was with and what I did the day before that, and 
so on) does not require that the ‘I’ that recalls this chain is the same thinker 
who had each of these thoughts all the way back to . . . when? As I hope is 
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clear, I am suggesting our identities are also an artefact of our being in the 
(social) world in interaction with others. But our continuing interest in our 
selves, our apparent need for self-fulfilment, self-satisfaction may not be 
universal; it may be a distraction from how we exist with others. 
In a similar but more abstract form, Parfit (1984, p. 267), summarising 
a line of argument by Bernard Williams, showed that it is ‘logically 
impossible for one person to be identical to more than one other person. I 
cannot be one and the same person as two different people’ and concurred 
with Williams that a sense of psychological continuity does not define 
identity. 
Taking account of cultural differences in beliefs about persons, one’s 
self and identity, we may see that a belief in the primacy of one’s self, one’s 
self-interest and identity is just one and, plausibly, only an illusory view. 
Other philosophical traditions espouse different perspectives. In 
Buddhism, for instance, the doctrine of ‘Annatta’ holds that there is no 
permanent underlying self. According to that view rather than emphasise 
the independence of individuals, the emphasis is on relatedness and on 
attending to others (Gergen, 2009; Gülerce, 2014; Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Sampson, 2008). For Buddhists, the concept of a ‘self’ (and the 
notion of self-interest) is considered to be a distraction and an invisible 
barrier; something that is best, therefore, considered dispensable. 
As self-conscious human beings we communicate intra-personally (self-
consciously we talk to ourselves and generate our private hypotheses) and 
inter-personally (consciously talking to others, seeking help and comfort, 
sharing ideas). We may reflect on an introspective idea or ‘sense’ of who 
each of us is, as an individual, as well as gaining perceptions (feedback) 
about who and what we are thought to be by others. We typically grow up 
seeking the affirmation of our worth from others. As social animals, we 
learn how to interact with others (to a greater or lesser extent), and rely on 
the existence of others in order to survive physically and emotionally. But, 
in turn, this leads us to discriminate between our own self and other 
selves.6 We develop notions about the people that we like, to whom we are 
kind (I am not you, though I am of your kind),; and the characteristics of 
those that we do or don’t like. Like it or not, we probably also find 
ourselves noting characteristics in those that we meet, comparing these 
with the characteristics of others that we know, and ascribing a descriptive 
label for people of one ‘kind’ or another. 
Amongst friends and partners, we will probably also find ourselves 
agreeing about the characteristics of certain groups or categories of people. 
These categories will embrace the characteristics of people that we admire, 
dislike, or see as belonging (clubbing) together in some way. Perhaps they 
are ‘hill walkers’, or ‘educationalists’,; ‘French’, or people who ‘are 
disabled’. Almost as inevitably, we identify individuals and label groups 
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or categories of people. Reciprocally, we ourselves will also be identified, 
categorised and labelled. To be of any value, a label should (like good 
theory) be both descriptive and explanatory (i.e. how do you relate to this 
person).7 However, logically, any label that might be applied to an 
individual can’t achieve that criterion, since it will derive from the 
categorisation of a group, and a group category has to have at least two 
members. Thus, the label describes an aggregated set of signs. The label 
is, therefore, non-specific and inherently discriminatory in that it is being 
applied to one category group with common characteristics in order to 
distinguish members of that group from another group who don’t share all 
the same characteristics that form the identifiers of the other group (see 
also Appiah, 2007, p. 75ff). However, if we believe in distinctive 
individuality, it is also not logical to apply a label to an individual, since 
although she or he may have many of the characteristics ascribed to a 
group category she or he will have other, unique qualities that distinguish 
her/him from others in the same group. 
I will return to this issue in a later chapter. For now let us note that the 
preceding lines also spell out that I do not think we can conceive ourselves 
to be isolated, entirely self-sufficient beings (autarchs). We exist in 
interaction with others (pace Margaret Thatcher, society does exist8), and, 
in turn, others cumulatively contribute to our view of ourselves. Others 
affirm that we exist. Whether or not it is necessary to label each other as 
members of a particular social group (or tribe) is another matter. Whether 
or not we choose to accept our given labels is also a matter for discussion 
(elsewhere). 
In addition to the alternative perspective provided by non-Wwestern 
philosophical traditions, our certainty and reliance on notions of a 
permanent individual ‘self’ are challenged both philosophically and 
materially. Parfit’s work provides a major philosophical challenge. Parfit 
showed that self-interest was ultimately self-defeating, and partly, but not 
solely, because the notion of a self as a distinctive entity is illusory. He 
argued that our sense of sameness over time is illusory and, ultimately, 
limiting (Parfit, 1984, p. 281). Materially, objectively, it is also apparent 
that neuroscience has so far failed to identify neural mechanisms that can 
be unambiguously identified as the locus of a ‘self’ (Gerson, 2014; Phillips 
et al., 2014; Ruby & Legrand, 2007). (Psychologically speaking, of course, 
any attempt to locate a material/neurological basis for the ‘self’ is, in any 
case, best regarded as a distraction.) 
As will become more apparent later, relating to someone as a having a 
fixed self and, therefore, a fixed personal identity, is problematic. 
Conversely, we very often choose to ignore the problems that ensue from 
not adhering to the notion of a fixed, invariant self and/or identity.9 For 
example when students take an exam, we assume that when the results are 
announced these are attributed to each individual as if each is the same 
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person who sat the exam. We also assume (most times fairly safely but not 
infallibly) that it is the same person who sat the exam and several years 
later presents the results as qualifications for a job. However, once when I 
was interviewing a candidate for a research post, we learned that before 
applying for the post the candidate had suffered a minor stroke that had 
affected recall. Although perfectly able to construct a very good written 
application, this was ‘no longer the same person’ (Parfit, 1984, p. 201) that 
had gained a first- class honours degree. (It is perhaps interesting to note 
that in the UK, checks are made to learn whether or not applicants for 
certain occupations have a criminal record that would bar them from 
contact with certain groups of people. Other than checking references that 
attest to the personal attributes of an applicant, we rarely undertake any 
other checks to establish that this is the same person as the one she or he 
claims to have been. (What does it mean ‘to be the same person?) This 
thought raises another question about how we might check that.10 
Notwithstanding the widely held (but logically invalid) assumptions 
about the persistence and consistency of distinct, unique and identifiable 
‘personhood’, in reality, an infinite number of changes in us will take place 
throughout our lifetime, moment by moment. These changes may be 
microscopic (at the level of individual cell death and regrowth), physical 
(for instance changes in visual acuity) or personal (getting married, 
divorced, having twins, for instance). Thus, as DiGiovanna noted: ‘across 
time, because some parts of a person change while others [may] remain 
the same, personal identity becomes indeterminate.’ (DiGiovanna, 2015, 
p. 389). Very often, we and others may barely notice these changes in 
ourselves being, as they are, slow and continuous, like ageing. But some 
changes (getting married, retiring from work, suffering a head injury) may 
be regarded as discontinuous step-changes – and life (person) changing 
(Bryson-Campbell, Shaw, O’Brien, Holmes, & Magalhaes, 2013; Conroy 
& O’Leary-Kelly, 2014; Thomas, Levack, & Taylor, 2014). Thus, like the 
self, one’s identity (whether private, personal, public or occupational) 
cannot safely be regarded as fixed or immutable. 
Suppose someone commits a crime:; murder, for instance. Immediately 
following the murder but before arrest and trial (the evidence is 
incontrovertible), the murderer is involved in an accident and suffers a 
major head injury. This injury damages the parts of his brain that are 
responsible for his long-term memory. In ‘recovery’, he cannot recall 
anything that happened prior to regaining consciousness in hospital and 
being told he had been in an accident. He does not know his name – or 
who he is. Can he now be regarded as the same person who had killed 
someone? Can he now be held responsible for that crime? 
In meditating on the notion of a personal ‘identity’, we could also draw 
on geo-political analogies. The identity of a nation (in fact, the very notion 
of a ‘nation’) is held to consist in a number of continuities (boundaries, 
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currency, cultural, linguistic) that at any one moment in time are perceived 
as fixed and static. The inhabitants of that nation are (too) often considered 
to have corresponding fixed ‘national’ characteristics. These are not idle 
speculations. They are a central concern of cosmopolitan philosophy11 that 
argues for acceptance of the shared humanity of all, and that local/national 
partisan interests in their ‘rights’ only matter if the human rights of 
‘foreign’ humans matter equally. This is, of course, crucial to 
conceptualising social inclusion and inclusive education. 
Of course, we can easily see that the idea of a homogenous state or a 
homogenous culture is a myth. So what happens when a country become 
fragmented – as, for instance, happened with Yugoslavia in the 1980s? 
What happened to the beliefs and identities of those who were born in 
Yugoslavia after 1946 (when the People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was 
established), who had hitherto regarded themselves as Yugoslavian and 
identified with President Marshall Tito? (We know some of the answers 
resulted in internecine bloodshed.) The notion of invariance and continuity 
implicit in these analogies carries over to some degree in vernacular 
notions of the identity of an individual as the same person now as was in 
the past and will be (at least while still alive) in the future.12 
A radically different envisioning of the self (‘I’), continuity and identity 
can be found in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas recognised the 
tension between identity (sameness), and the re-discovery and re-creation 
that follows interaction with others: 
‘To be I is, over and beyond any individuation that can be 
derived from a system of references, to have identity as one’s 
content. The I is not a being that always remains the same, but 
is the being whose existing consists in identifying itself, in 
recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it. It is the 
primal identity, the primordial work of identification.’ 
(Levinas, 1969, p. 36) 
Levinas’s philosophical perspective (that drew on phenomenological and 
psychoanalytic theories) is not wholly irreconcilable with the earlier views 
I found in Parfit’s work. However, Levinas’s very different perspectives 
on humanity provides a view of the experience of identity development 
and survival in the face of threat and change. It is also important in the 
way it provides for a much deeper understanding of inter-relationships (in 
terms of ‘intersubjectivity’) with others. Levinas provided a language and 
concepts that enable us to interrogate the power dynamics within our 
beliefs about, and corresponding existential encounters and interactions 
with, others. I will return to the ideas of Levinas (and his counterpart, 
Jacques Lacan) and theories about the effects of the relationship with 
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others and in particular their notions of tThe oOther in Cchapter 2, but note 
here that Levinas provided us with a theoretical view of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity, that shows how developmentally we distinguish our 
selves from others, while being bound by an the abiding, over-riding 
ethical responsibility for others: 
‘The irreducible and ultimate experience of relationship appears 
to me to be . . . not in synthesis, but in the face to face of 
humans, in sociality, in its moral signification. But it must be 
understood that morality comes not as a secondary layer, above 
an abstract reflection . . . morality has an independent and 
preliminary range. First philosophy is an ethics.’ 
(Levinas, 1985, p. 77) 
Levinas’s ideas about intersubjectivity were later taken up by 
developmental psychologists such as John and Elizabeth Newson 
(Newson, 1979; Newson & Newson, 1975) and Colwyn Trevarthen 
(Trevarthen, 1979, 1998), who studied the development of parent- child 
communication and the development and nature of self-consciousness in 
infancy. While the developmental perspective of that research has proven 
helpful in a number of ways, it is also helps in reminding us that the 
perception of one’s self is part of and due to relationships with others. It 
has its origins in the mother-baby face-to-face relationship (Fogel, de 
Koeyer, Bellagamba, & Bell, 2002; Vandenberg, 1999) and ongoing 
dialogue (Buber, 1987; Gergen, 1991; Levinas, 1969). As Kenneth Gergen 
said: 
‘It is not individual ‘“I’”s’ who create relationships, but 
relationships that create the sense of ‘“I’” . . . ‘”I’ am just an I by 
virtue of playing a particular part in a relationship.’ 
(Gergen, 1991, p. 157) 
Thus, Gergen’s view was that an inner ‘self’ was a mythical creation, that 
the sense of ‘I-ness’ was simply an artefact of the experience of 
relationships 
[In a later chapter, I will consider the work of Hubert Hermans, but for 
now just note that Hermans suggested an alternative, dialogic, construction 
of self, granting the notional self greater autonomy in being able to adopt 
a multiplicity of positions: 
‘The self is not only ‘“here’” but also ‘“there’,” and because of 
the power of imagination the person can act as if he or she were 
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the other . . . If one insists that and an individual creates an 
imaginal other, it can equally be maintained that an individual 
experiences the imaginal other as creating himself of herself.’ 
(Hermans et al., 1992, p. 29)] 
One of the important implications of Levinas’s work is the emphasis he 
placed on the unique existential experience available to our selves in each 
and every encounter with an other. However, if, rather than treat each 
encounter as unique, we perceive the other as threatening and, in order to 
protect our selves we categorise this other as a ‘something-or-other’ (as we 
can all too easily be seduced to do), we deny the significance and value of 
both our own self’s and an other’s face-to-face experience of the encounter 
by reducing each other to mere objects.13 By acting thus, by dehumanising 
the nature of experience, we place our selves in a profoundly unethical 
position. Alternatively, we can engage uniquely and ethically with each 
other and recognise that each other is radically different from every other 
other. We may, if we allow it, be simultaneously curious, mystified, and 
anxious about an encounter with an other and the responsibility that comes 
with the encounter. Levinas said, ‘The relationship with the other is a 
relationship with mystery.’ (Levinas, 1987, p. 75). Of course, the ultimate 
encounter with an other is the encounter with death. While that is beyond 
the scope and remit of this book, Levinas provided words that help us 
calibrate our more ‘every day’ encounters (if this is not heretical): 
‘It is not with the nothingness of death, of which we precisely 
know nothing, that the analysis must begin, but with the 
situation where something absolutely unknowable appears. 
Absolutely unknowable means foreign to all light, rendering 
every assumption of possibility impossible, but where we 
ourselves are seized.’ 
(Levinas, 1987, p. 71) 
Thus, we may recognise the opportunity in each and every encounter with 
an other to respect the encounter as bestowed with meaning, responsibility 
for care, and creativity. Levinas, therefore, held that morality and justice 
derived from the ethical requirements of individual interactions – and the 
mediation of these in the context of the host of competing interactions in 
which we each engage throughout life: 
‘How is that there is justice? I can answer that it is the fact of 
the presence of someone else next to the Other, from whence 
comes justice. Justice, exercised through institutions, which are 
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inevitable, must always be held in check by the initial 
interpersonal relation.’ 
(Levinas, 1985, pp. 89–90; emphasis added) 
1.2 Personal identity, autonomy and boundaries 
Notions of personal (individual) identity and autonomy exemplify the 
tension between self and society as indicated above in the work of Levinas 
but also discussed more recently by Kwame Anthony Appiah (Appiah, 
2001, 2007) in relation to what Appiah called the ‘unsociability of 
individualism’. 
In the current political climate in which I am writing (March 2017) this 
might also become the ‘xenophobia of individualism’ on the basis of what 
is being said on the streets of New York and Washington (President Donald 
Trump), London (Brexit) and Amsterdam (Geert Wilders): ‘we need to 
reinforce our border to protect our (national) identity’. Given these trends 
of isolationism and inter-cultural suspicion and hostility, it becomes 
incumbent on us to seek to understand the nature of these difficulties (that 
are not ‘little local difficulties’14) and ways that through education we can 
learn to be human and democratic. 
One of the potential problems with a self-constructed ‘identity’ that 
Appiah detected, is that it can be too rigid, too fixed and become outdated. 
In arriving at his conclusion, Appiah suggested that an agentic ‘self’ that 
constructs identity operates within the constraints and possibilities of the 
society at that time and in that place. (Just as Foucault (2012) argued that 
we can only truly understand the behaviour and mores of an historical 
society in terms of the tools of enquiry that were to hand at that time, not 
with the supposedly more ‘sophisticated’ tools and knowledge of our 
present civilisation.) As I will discuss in considering the extent of our 
personal autonomy, the notion of a ‘causal self’ that is free to reflect on the 
past in order to organise the future, is open to challenge (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999, p. 463).15 I think the evidence shows that within 
education, the professional autonomy of teachers is at risk of becoming 
seriously, fatally, compromised (see Bellah, 1997 for a warning that has 
not expired). Notwithstanding that caveat, if it is to be of value, the identity 
that we each have agency over and within must help us make sense of our 
life in the culture in which we find ourselves at a particular moment in 
time as well as accepting the validity of the cultural values and traditions 
held by others. 
Appiah (2007) illustrated his thesis with the example of Mr Stevens, the 
butler in Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel, The Remains of the Day. It is helpful to 
reflect on this here, too. In the novel, Stevens is portrayed as a challenge 
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to the notion that one is the architect of one’s identity. Ishiguro seemed 
here to be suggesting that the lack of any sense of autonomy (to be self-
creative, to continue to become) is ultimately socially fatal, if not lethal. 
Taking a critical-realist perspective, the sociologist Margaret Archer 
(2003) formulated identity rather differently. Her formulation involves a 
reciprocal relationship between personal identity and social structures in 
which existing structures provide constraints and affordances for personal 
agency which in turn challenges and transforms the pre-existing structures 
. (In essence, that is where Stevens fails: he is born into a tradition and 
existence of servitude that he does not challenge or attempt to change. His 
passive acceptance ultimately, suffocating his attempts to join with 
another, the housekeeper, Miss Kenton, in a social, intimate, life together.) 
In her work, Archer argued, as have Gergen, Levinas and others, that 
personal identity emerges from an ongoing iterative intra-personal 
conversation (dialogue16) that matches the cyclical creative interactions 
between one’s individuality and social contexts. (Stevens, the hide-bound 
butler, illustrates the failure that follows from being either unable to break 
out of the uncritical, self-serving and, therefore, solipsistic nature of his 
intra-personal dialogues, or him-self alone being unable to envisage other 
possible ways of being, nor enter into a responsible and authentic dialogue 
with an other.) 
This also illustrates a fundamental moral challenge for members of a 
liberal democratic society: how do we treat others that we may not agree 
with? How do we treat others who have been identified and labelled (or 
identify and label themselves) as ‘different’ or challenging in some way? 
To what extent do we collude with a generalised pattern of behaviours that 
may be socially connoted by the label? 
It is clear that accommodating diversity is not in all ways easy. But we 
can at times, and in some places, find it very hard to see the reciprocal 
nature of our relationships (and behaviours) with others and our beliefs in 
our selves and our supposed identities. We may feel unique, but who is it 
that reinforces that belief – and more poignantly, why, and what do we gain 
from such self-centredness? A more formal, sociological, statement of a 
similar model of agentic identity may be found in Lois McNay’s work, in 
which she suggested, ‘[If] the idea of agency refers, in some sense, to the 
individual’s capacity for self-reflection and self-evaluation then it needs to 
be examined from some kind of hermeneutic perspective.’ (McNay, 2004, 
p. 178). (Our interactions with others are, of course, inherently a form of 
interpersonal communication, although they are not always recognised as 
such.) Thus, the interpretation of enacted identity needs to be considered 
as being both experienced and objectified. Problematically, how do we 
survive with others; how much autonomy do we have in relation to others? 
In the light of such questions, it is possible to recognise how personal 
aims, plans or enacted identities may not be wholly viable, understood or 
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even, in certain circumstances – or cultures – unpunished. For example, it 
remains the case that identifying oneself (or being identified) as a member 
of certain specific religious groups in some cultures is dangerous to the 
point of being fatal. A current example being is the genocidal campaign 
against Shia Muslims in Iraq. Accounts of the experience of being 
perceived and vilified as a member of a ‘minority’ group (black and 
female, for instance) in a certain time and place tell us vividly how hard it 
can be retain belief in the validity of one’s self, agency and identity.17 In 
such circumstances it becomes hard (even impossible) to retain integrity 
and belief in one’s self, existentially avoiding ‘bad faith’ (Sartre, 1958), 
while simultaneously recognising that one does not, in reality, have total 
autonomy, free to choose to act in any way one can conceive of acting. 
In different ways, such examples indicate threats to individual identity 
and agency and reveal 
‘how agency and identity are constituted relationally as social, 
cultural, and material phenomena. [Revealing t]his is necessary 
if we wish to understand the resources and constraints of 
agency and to scrutinize the historical processes that, through 
discourse and subject positions, produce their experiences.’ 
(Eteläpelto, Vähäsantanen, Hökkä, & Paloniemi, 2013, p. 53) 
Thus, we can see how societies (or groups within groups) are prone to 
dictate, proscribe and discriminate. Alternatively, as emphasised by 
Gergen, Levinas and Appiah, we can accept responsibility as individuals 
for ourselves and others as co-equal partners and ensure that our mutual 
selves are not annihilated before our physical death. 
1.2.1 Degrees of autonomy? 
Just as the notion of a ‘self’ is best regarded as an epiphenomenon of 
consciousness, so too is much of what we retrospectively may regard as 
autonomous choice. In fact, a large proportion of our everyday lives is 
conducted with little or no consciously deliberate choice (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999; Kahneman, 2011). That’s a psychological reality (as 
much as anything is psychologically ‘real’) in that what determines our 
actual response to very many social situations – including our response to 
perceived stereotypes – are unthinking, automatic responses. It is, 
therefore, probable that aspects of our presentation to others (our public or 
occupational ‘identity’) are not formulated by a consciously agentic ‘self’ 
but mostly consist in automatic or habituated responses. (And that has 
been confirmed by neuroscientists (see, for instance Schultz, 2016).) 
However, while it may also be clear to some of us that we believe in our 
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capability to make deliberated ethical and moral choices – and we may 
also call this sense of being able to choose our ‘autonomy’, – to what extent 
is it possible for some in our society (given their particular circumstances) 
to even conceive of alternative actions, to feel the degree of autonomy that 
others might deem that we have in principle? What choices do we really 
have? For example, to what extent is it possible for unemployed parents in 
socio-economically deprived communities to exercise agentic choice over 
which school their children attend? What ethical and practical choices are 
readily available to the more 25% of all children in the UK who grow up 
in poverty (CPAG, 2016)? To believe that we all have equity of choice, of 
autonomy, is, I think, to succumb to or to collude with the hegemony of 
neoliberalism. Inevitably, it is hard, if not impossible, for others in 
different circumstances to understand the fact and experience of living in 
poverty (for instance) and the consequent available opportunities. While 
the circumstances and dispositions will be shared by others in a similar 
socio-economic environment, they cannot be experienced with similar 
effects by others in very different environments. It is the shared experience 
and culture that provide the socialising environment, the habitus 
(Bourdieu, 1999) that shapes expectations of agency. 
The extent, limitations and sensitivities that may be held to be associated 
with autonomy, therefore, raise ethical and moral questions about the 
possibilities of ‘self-realisation’ and identity formation. In view of the 
prevailing educational environment in which education is 
commercialisedcommercialised, these questions have specific and urgent 
salience for the professionals involved, including, most specifically for 
present purposes, teachers (see, for instance, Bellah, 1997; Biesta, 
Priestley, & Robinson, 2015; Taylor, 2017). What autonomy do they have; 
to what extent are they able to be active and responsive creators of 
educational opportunities; to what extent are they able to realise and enter 
into dialogue about their enterprise with themselves and others, including 
those (pupils) for whose future purposes the capacity for interpersonal and 
intercultural dialogue is crucial? My contention is that teachers’ ethical 
autonomy, creativity and dialogic responsiveness have all been severely 
compromised by the prevailing neoliberal economic and political policies.  
In the past, it was probably true that in many Wwestern societies’ 
educational curricula, there was a more or less explicit aim to promote 
autonomy of thought and action. There has also been (at least until quite 
recently), in principle, a policy to promote increasingly inclusive 
education. Inclusion implies greater acceptance of diversity in education. 
In accord with this policy, teachers were encouraged to include and teach 
a greater range of abilities and aptitudes. These two principles (of 
developing autonomy and of increasing inclusion) have led to some tricky 
questions. Thus, if autonomy is to be encouraged (how) should inclusive 
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teachers include those children who don’t (or can’t) be autonomous or 
those who in their behaviour seek to demonstrate total autonomy by, for 
instance, not attending or regularly disrupting lessons? In a democratic 
society what degrees of autonomy are to be allowed or encouraged? Or, as 
Appiah asked, to what extent are diversity and individuality ‘plaited 
together’, and does the language of autonomy reflect an ‘arrogant 
insularity’ (Appiah, 2007, p. 40ff)? To rephrase Russell’s paradox18 
(again, but more clearly), in a liberal democracy, is it tolerable to set limits 
to autonomy? 
1.2.2 Ethical autonomy 
Knowing what we do know about the unavoidable biasing effects of 
groups (Tajfel, 1981, 2010) that I will return to in Cchapter 5, hierarchies 
of power, and the communication of societal values that is integral to 
education, we might consider how (or, indeed, if), we can, for instance, be 
both moral and teachers of individual autonomy (or self-authorship). 
Meanwhile, while questions about how realistic our sense of freedom to 
choose may seem to be both academically – philosophically and politically 
– interesting, the more important questions in the present context are about 
what the pragmatic and psychological limits are to autonomy in social and 
educational settings? To what extent are we able to help ‘plait together’ 
relatedness and individuality? A complementary general moral question 
posed by Parfit (1984, p. 3), also about autonomy and self-interest, is: how 
does someone best achieve ‘the outcomes that would be best for himself, 
and that would make his life go, for him, as well as possible’? 
Parfit proposed that 
‘Even if I never do what, of the acts that are possible for me, 
will be worse for me, it may be worse for me if I am purely 
self-interested. It may be better for me if I have some other 
disposition.’ 
(Parfit, 1984, p. 5) 
Parfit argued that pursuing a purely selfish aim is, ultimately, self-
defeating and suggested that therefore, ‘[i]It may not be irrational to act, 
knowingly, against one’s own self-interest’ (Parfit, 1984, p. 317). The logic 
here is that autonomous acts can be better if other directed. So, Parfit 
concluded, 
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‘It is rational to do what one knows will best achieve what, after 
ideal deliberation, one most wants or values, even when one 
knows this is against one’s own self-interest.’ 
(Parfit, 1984, p. 461) 
But, as Kahneman and others have shown us, we do not always think (or 
react) rationally, particularly under pressure (Kahneman, 2011). Thus 
‘ideal deliberation’ may not truly reflect everyday reality. But, we like to 
believe, we are not automatons merely reacting to external stimuli that, 
aside from physical phenomena (such as gravity, the weather etc.), come 
from a host of other people who are, likewise, not ‘automatons’. And, 
because we can articulate these beliefs (because we say so) and convince 
ourselves this is true, we have, as Appiah paraphrased Kant, ‘to act as if 
freedom is possible even though we can’t provide any theoretical 
justification for it.’ (Appiah, 2007, p. 56). But the sense of autonomy, of 
freedom to act intentionally toward others, also carries with it 
responsibilities (provided we also recognise morality) including, the view, 
as Parfit wrote, that ‘[a]Autonomy does not include the right to impose 
upon oneself, for no good reason, great harm.’ (Appiah, 2007, p. 321). As 
Sartre also said (echoing Marx (2008)), ‘man being condemned to be free 
carries the whole weight of the world on his shoulders; he is responsible 
for the world and for himself as a way of being.’ (Sartre, 1958, p. 553). 
Part of that responsibility, I suggest, is to ratify and sustain the belief that 
we are autonomous individuals and not selfless automatons. But, as 
Cigdem Kagitcibasi said, ‘Autonomy and agency are not antithetical to 
relatedness.’ (Kagitcibasi, 2005, p. 404). In Kagitcibasi’s modelling of self 
in relation to society, she proposed that by understanding autonomy as 
comprising two dimensions of meaning we can avoid positing 
dichotomising relatedness and autonomy. One of the dimensions she called 
the ‘interpersonal distance’ to represent the extent to which self is 
distanced from others or connected to others. The second dimension, 
termed ‘agency’, ranges from autonomy to heteronomy. These two 
dimensions together, Kagitcibasi suggested, ‘reflect basic human needs of 
relatedness and autonomy.’ While it might be in someone’s own personal 
self-interest to regard others as automatons or puppets (in order to achieve 
some ideal outcome such as world domination), it is ultimately ‘better to 
have some other disposition’ to not diminish the humanity and creativity 
of others, but to regard others with respect as fellow beings who also have 
beliefs in their autonomy. Thus: 
‘The standpoint of agency is connected, in the most direct 
possible way, to our concern to live intelligible lives in 
community with other people . . . This practical interest requires 
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us to be able to articulate our own behaviour in relation to 
theirs, and this we do through our understanding of them as 
having beliefs and intentions – in short, as reasoning – and also 
having passions and prejudices: in short, as always potentially 
unreasonable.’ 
(Appiah, 2007, p. 58) 
There is, however, a risk in what Appiah said here. The risk is partly 
semantic but also provides a boundary to our casual shorthand use of 
language. The shorthand aggregation of individuals in a group risks 
breaching the democratic rights, autonomy and diversity of others. The 
primary risk lies in the blurring of individuality and groups – as in ‘our 
understanding of them as having beliefs and intentions’. The implied 
construction of ‘them’ as a uniform ‘other’ is the problem here. Should we, 
can we not insist that we does not oppose ‘them’? I feel certain that Appiah 
would not have intended a slur on the individuality of others, and his words 
are an illustration of the limits of language. ‘We’ implies the in-group and 
within the in-group we know more about and are more sensitive to the 
diverse nature of aptitudes, dispositions and needs of individuals. 
Categorisation in any event obscures the infinite variations between 
individuals within the category (Foroni & Rothbart, 2011, 2013; Rothbart, 
Davis-Stitt, & Hill, 1997). Locating others as an outgrouout-group also 
entails the homogenisation of diversity and the unethical disregard for the 
uniqueness of each individual. ‘Essentialising’ the nature of individuals 
socially categorised in this way can, as I will discuss in Cchapter 4, also 
limit teachers’ beliefs in their self- – efficacy with respect to such 
(Gibbs & Elliott, 2015). 
1.2.3 Relative autonomy 
There are many examples of the effects of the prior expectations and 
consequent treatment of groups affecting not only the beliefs and actions 
of individuals within the group, but also the intentions and actions of those 
who ‘other’ that group. In the most extreme situations, this latter has 
resulted in the attempt of one group to annihilate all individuals thought to 
represent another group.19 The effects of active ‘othering’ were illustrated 
in a classroom ‘experiment’ (that would now almost certainly be 
considered unethical). 
Appalled by the assassination of Martin Luther King and a reporter’s 
use of language20 , Jane Elliott, a primary school teacher in Randall, Iowa, 
devised an exercise that was intended to allow the children in her class to 
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experience the effects of racial stereotyping.21 Her intention was to show 
what segregation might feel like.22 Elliott told her class of children that, 
like her, blue-eyed people were smarter. She then gave the blue-eyed 
children brown ribbons and told them to drape these round the necks of 
the brown-eyed children so that it would be easy to see the less smart 
children in the class. The blue-eyed children were then seated at the front 
of class, and reminded that they were the smart children. They were given 
extra privileges – such as second helpings at lunch and additional playtime. 
Blue-eyed and brown-eyed children were not allowed to drink from the 
same water fountain. The blue-eyed children were told not to interact with 
the brown-eyes who, they were reminded were not so smart. Over the next 
few days, Elliott noticed that the demeanour of the two groups changed. 
The blue-eyed children became arrogant and bossy, while their brown-
eyed classmates became timid and subservient. Elliott also found that the 
performance of brown- eyed children in tests deteriorated, even in areas in 
which beforehand, they had done well. 
Notice this last point: the performance of individuals was affected by 
the labelling and treatment of the group. 
As I will discuss in a later chapter, social experiences and perceptions 
inside or outwith social or cultural groups have powerful effects on how 
we act with and toward others. As we will see, power and agency have 
been critical factors in some models of teachers’ identity. 
Groucho Marx’s famous quip ‘I don’t care to belong to any club that 
will have me as a member’ has more than a grain of sense. John Gray said 
something similar: ‘One cannot be, at one and the same time, a fully 
autonomous individual and a dutifully obedient member of a traditional 
community.’ (Gray, 2000, p. 56). As we have seen, being a member of a 
group generates alliances and confers allegiances (albeit some quite 
unconscious) that will curb autonomy. There are also socio-political 
tensions within the assumed rights to autonomy of groups and the extent 
to which a group respects the rights to autonomy of its members. Within 
educational settings, particularly those that can still espouse the 
development of autonomy, there will, inevitably, therefore, be questions 
and debates about the extent to which they accept diversity. While part of 
the democratic enterprise of education, according to Gert Biesta (2015), 
has to be to accept the existence of the need for such debate and to allow 
progress in the ensuing dialogue, it seems to me that this should not be an 
unprincipled or infrequently convened ad hoc debate. As is evident, 
accounts of the very principled educational initiative to restructure the 
Finnish school system in the 1970s have revealed radically different, 
sustained and arguably more democratic and egalitarian outcomes than 
could be found in the UK or the USA at any time in the past 150 years 
(Sahlberg, 2015). 
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In summary, although we may find ourselves compared to others (and 
ourselves do the same to/with others), it seems that the extent to which we 
author our own identity and, thereby, our sense of agency, is best 
considered ipsatively relative. The potential strength of our sense of 
individual personal autonomy comes from a synergy of beliefs born of 
unique experiences that we can do what is necessary in order to do what 
we want to achieve – our sense of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), 
dispositions (Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ (see Lizardo, 2004; McNay, 
2004)), and the extent to which we feel personally enabled or limited by 
(and responsible for) our circumstances, capacity, and the rules and 
conventions that we follow (Wittgenstein, 1972, Remark 219). However, 
as I have implied above, beliefs in our personal identity and autonomy are, 
necessarily, artefacts of the interaction of our physical and psychological 
‘selves’ with others in our social contexts.23 In that sense, our identities are 
socially constructed, but in another sense simply mythical, and like many 
myths can have powerful, compelling, effects on the imagination that 
make us believe they are real. In the former conceptualisation, we are, as 
Appiah has reminded us, morally and ethically bounded by our social 
identities and responsibilities. It is to examine the nature of our social 
identities from philosophical and psychological perspectives that I now 
turn. 
1.3 Socially constructed identity, social identity, moral 
and ethical responsibility 
Part of my intention in writing this book is to expose and examine ways in 
which the potential autonomy and efficacy, the creative influence of 
teachers is thwarted. To do this properly, requires, as Kevin Carriere 
suggested, a much better understanding of the psychological frameworks, 
systems and tensions (enabling as well as inhibitory). Carriere wrote: 
‘The heroic potential of a citizen . . . can only be understood 
through an analysis of the system that surrounds and guides the 
person, while also recognizing and examining how the 
individual uses that system for his or her best comprehended 
interests. Yet, even then, there lies the existence of power 
dynamics that are used by both system and person. The triadic 
interactions of power, values, and person emerge not just from 
the study of one, but from the examination of the borders 
between and across the systems at play.’ 
(Carriere, 2016, p. 162) 
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Inherent in these frameworks are the power dynamics of educational 
systems and interpersonal interactions between educational personnel and 
with their pupils and students. As I’ve already suggested, I don’t think it is 
clear what the real purpose or potential for education might be, nor, 
therefore, what it is that teachers should be expected to do for the best. 
As I have already noted, Parfit posed the question that motivated his 
enquiries as ‘Many of us want to know what we have most reason to do.’. 
He went on to say, ‘Several theories answer this question. Some of these 
are moral questions; others are theories about rationality. When applied 
to some of our decisions, different theories give us different answers.’ 
(Parfit, 1984, p. 3). Thus, I suggest we must remain alert to, and critical of, 
our theoretical orientations. 
Further, if we are to fully consider the limits and responsibilities of 
individuals (who are mostly members of at least one society), we need to 
consider the terms used to dissect this problem. Appiah distinguished 
between ethical and moral questions. The former, he suggested, are about 
‘which kinds of lives are good or bad for a person to lead.’. The moral 
questions are about the ‘principles about how a person should treat other 
people.’ (Appiah, 2007, p. xiii). In this section, I present some of the 
evidence that underpins the moral issue about how we treat each other and 
how that affects who we are, what choices we make, and what we can do. 
Ultimately, this relates strongly to how our identities are forged in society. 
Making particular use of Appiah’s work I shall discuss first some of the 
philosophical and psychological ideas about ‘socially constructed 
identity’. I will then turn to the work of Henri Tajfel, John Turner, Rupert 
Brown and others who were responsible for the development of ‘Social 
iIdentity tTheory’ for a subtly different and important perspective on the 
nature of identity and its effects. 
Marilyn Brewer noted that 
‘Social identities are categorizations of the self into more 
inclusive social units that depersonalize the self concept, where 
I becomes we.’ 
(Brewer, 1991, p. 476) 
That ‘depersonalize’ does not mean ‘dehumanise’. Our identities as 
members of social groups, Appiah argued, are how we are perceived, 
‘identified’, by others. Appiah provided examples of how racial and 
cultural groups have been identified (in the sense of being given an 
identification, a label to distinguish one ‘group’ from another identifiable 
‘group’) by others. In that way, it is possible to see how individuals might 
consider themselves to be constructed by the perceptions (and, therefore, 
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the actions (verbal, physical or both) of others toward them). As we have 
seen in Jane Elliott’s exercise (let alone the genocides we have witnessed), 
stereotypical and prejudicial identification of others can all too easily lead 
to inhuman, degrading and lethal behaviour. Significantly, in the case of 
Elliott’s exercise there was no choice, no agency granted to the ‘inferior’ 
groups. In genocide, the intention is to annihilate the identity, personhood 
and humanity of others. Denial of agency and control has powerful effects 
as studies of the phenomenon of ‘learned helplessness’ have 
demonstrated.24 
In more ordinary, ‘every day’, situations individuals are more likely to 
experience some sense of their own agency and, consequently, feel able to 
exercise choice (but see earlier comments, above, about the reality of 
choice and the effects of habitus). For a range of reasons, we may each 
choose to join any number of groups. In some of these we may have a 
greater sense of ‘belonging’,; a sense that we and others in the group are 
members of the same social category. (At this point, we need to recognise 
the difference between social categories and categories that are of an 
essentially distinct and natural kind.) Thus, I could (in principle) choose to 
be a Ccatholic; but I cannot choose to be a tiger – or an ant (Mellor, 1977; 
Quine, 1977; Rothbart et al., 1997).) Marilynn Brewer suggested that 
while individuals might recognise that they belong to several groups, they 
may not necessarily choose to identify with any of these. She suggested 
that social identities are chosen by individuals in the act of needing 
validation and positive affirmation of themselves as being similar to others 
(i.e. not alone), while also seeking to establish their uniqueness. (Brewer, 
1991, p. 477).25 Under certain circumstances (in particularly large 
organisations, for instance) the tension inherent in striving for the balance 
between inclusion and uniqueness may be resolved by identifying with a 
distinctive subgroup (Hogg & Terry, 2000, p. 131). (This, it seems to me, 
is exactly what may be happening when children do not feel they belong 
(they recognise they are not being positively included) in a particular class, 
subject or ability group. What often happens as a result is that they begin 
to identify with another group – perhaps a group whose different patterns 
of behaviour provide models of behaviour with which they can identify 
and give them affirmation of ‘belonging’.) 
The formal development of social identity theory followed from Henri 
Tajfel’s psychological theorising and experimentation in the 1970s. Tajfel, 
both appalled and motivated by his experiences as a Jew in WWII (as being 
violently ‘othered’), conducted a series of studies that illustrated how 
perceiving oneself to be a member of a group evoked differential 
behaviours that favoured those believed to be members of one’s own group 
(the ‘in-group’) and derogated those in an ‘outgrouout-group’ . From this 
early work, Tajfel and his colleagues built a substantial body of research 
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that systematically examined intergroup behaviour (much of it set out in 
Tajfel, 1981, 2010). 
The experience of being socially constructed carries with it, not just 
semantically, a sense of being construed as a passive object, liable to being 
victimised, as were Jews, communists and homosexuals in the 
concentration and extermination camps of WWII; as have been Shia 
Muslims in Iraq; as are children who ‘fail’ the 11+. 
Social identity theory as developed by Tajfel and his successors differs 
from notions of socially constructed identities in the emphasis social 
identity theory gives to a sense of autonomy and agency. Social iIdentity 
theory underlines that one does, in principle, choose which groups provide 
the more positive affirmation of aspects of one’s own self or identity. 
Social identity theory also provides understanding of social intergroup 
behaviour. Social identity theory starts from the premise that one’s social 
identity derives from group membership and ‘proposes that people strive 
to achieve or maintain a positive social identity (thus boosting their self-
esteem), and that positive identity derives largely from favourable 
comparisons that can be made between the ingroups and relevant 
outgrououtgroups.’ (Brown, 2000, p. 747). 
John Turner (one of Tajfel’s co-workers) summarised ‘Social identity’ 
as being 
‘. . . a subsystem of the self-concept . . . Social identity seems to 
be ‘switched on’ by certain situations in ways that we do not as 
yet fully understand. Once functioning, social identity monitors 
and construes social stimuli and provides a basis for regulating 
behaviour. Its cognitive output seems to be uniquely implicated 
in intra- and intergroup behaviour. In other words . . . social 
identity is the cognitive mechanism which makes group 
behaviour possible.’ 
(Turner, 2010, p. 21) 
If we accept this formulation of social identity, we must also agree that 
human social activity can only be understood in its social (and political) 
context. (I suspect the second half of that sentence is true in any event (as 
Herb Simon illustrated) but is independent of any notion of ‘identity’.) 
More recent work in this field has provided a more nuanced perspective 
on the relationships between individuals and their respective in- and out-
groups. This suggests that not only do individuals seek membership of 
groups that affirm personal identities and purposes but in doing so reduce 
uncertainty about personal identity: 
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‘Group identification through self-categorization reduces 
uncertainty because it causes people to internalize a prototype 
that describes their identity; prescribes their attitudes, 
perceptions, and behaviors; and makes the behavior of others 
predictable. It also furnishes consensual validation of one’s 
identity and identity-related attributes.’ 
(Hogg, Abrams, & Brewer, 2017, p. 5) 
This suggests that in conditions where personal factors (identity and 
purpose) are challenged or are uncertain, group allegiances and 
membership may become yet more salient and group identity protective. 
The nature and characteristics of groups then becomes more important. 
Groups that are well structured and bounded (‘entitative’ groups) in which 
there are shared aspirations and high levels of positive interaction between 
in-group members are most effective at reducing ‘self-categorisation-
induced self-uncertainty.’ (Hogg, 2014, p. 339). 
I will return to these issues in Chapter 6, but meanwhile, in the next 
chapter I give further consideration to notions of the ‘Other’, processes of 
othering, the effects of being ‘othered’ and the relevance of this to 
education. 
1.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I have outlined some of the more theoretical and admittedly 
abstract ideas that are relevant foreground and context for due 
consideration of how teachers are currently affected by educational, 
political and economic circumstances of education in the UK in the early 
21st century. 
Drawing on the work of Derek Parfit, Emmanuel Levinas, Kwame 
Anthony Appiah and others, I have offered an outline of the distinction 
between personal beliefs about one’s self and the sense of identity with 
which others will interact. I have hedged my bets a bit as far as my 
understanding of the underlying nature of the ‘self’ and identity. On the 
one hand I accept and agree with Parfit that these constructs are emergent 
properties, epiphenomena, of individual brains. But, these brains 
themselves are susceptible to environmental influences, particularly those 
due to interactions with others and, reflexively, with oneself. It is these 
resultant psychological phenomena that are for my thinking most 
important. It is these that in everyday life we have to manage and live with. 
The underlying neurology is in everyday terms irrelevant. I am, therefore, 
also siding with phenomenologists such as Derrida, the philosophical work 
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of Appiah and Levinas, and the humanist psychologies of Gergen. While 
in relation to our relationships with others we are, in our selves and our 
public identities, meta-epiphenomena, the synergy of our unique 
neurology and our interactions and dialogues with others, we do not 
directly experience our neurology. We do experience each other and 
ourselves. It is these experiences and our interpersonal responsibilities to 
these that we experience. I am, accordingly, suggesting that it is unethical 
to disrespect both our unique available autonomy and our unique 
functional identities. It is, therefore, immoral at any interpersonal level to 
aggregate categories or groups of people under a label since that is to 
dehumanise unique experiences. 
Our interactions with ourselves and others and our underlying beliefs 
about others call into question moral and ethical issues about the scope and 
responsibility of personal autonomy and agency. Particularly within 
education (where notions of ‘teaching and learning’ may be debated), but 
in any event in general, the interactions we have with others and that others 
have with us are integral part of socialising and the construction of each 
‘identity’ but also of the groups in which we each best fit. 
With these rather abstract ideas in the background, in the next chapter, I 
turn to look at the philosophical and psychological grounding for ‘the 
other’ in the abstract and in the reality of its psychological implications. 
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researchers to take this as axiomatic of ‘human nature’, whereas from 
an evolutionary perspective, as Kagitcibasi (2005) reminded us, 
human kind has depended on cooperation and relatedness for survival. 
6 See, for instance, Fuchs (2013); Reddy (2003); Rochat (2003) 
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connected series of memories of our self going right back to our first 
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personal history and identity. Parfit (p 236) suggested that at the near 
end of this combined spectrum of identity ‘is the normal case in which 
a future person would be fully continuous with me as I am now, both 
physically and psychologically. This person would be me in just the 
way that, in my actual life, it will be me who wakes up tomorrow. At 
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the far end of this spectrum [perhaps as the result of an operation] the 
resulting person would have no continuity with me as I am now . . .’ 
11 As set out by Appiah (1997) and Hayden (2017), and critically 
interrogated by Igarashi and Saito (2014) 
12 But there is little evidence of a persistent material reality to a continuous 
‘self’. Whilst brain injury may radically affect who a person things 
she is or is perceived to be, and that it seems intuitive to think that this 
may be related to aspects of autobiographical memory, there is little 
uncontested evidence to show how these concepts may be related 
(Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013). 
13 I return to the consideration of ‘others’ and the process of ‘othering’ in 
Cchapter 3 but here note that as Aydan Güulerce (2014, p. 245) has 
said, ‘“’Othering”’ is an un/conscious and primarily projective 
disidentification with an attempt to organise all of the disowned, or 
non-self experience, and history under an equally illusory unified or 
cohesive category.’. 
14 Harold Macmillan, January 1958, on the resignation of the entire 
Treasury team. 
15 (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 463). Appiah (2007, p. 42) also draws 
attention to the problem for advocates of a strong model individual 
autonomy of the need for the existence a ‘true self’. 
16 In an earlier draft of this chapter, I had conflated dialogue (and 
dialogics), and dialectics until my colleague Wilma Barrow pointed 
out the radical difference between these two terms. Wegerif (2008, 
p. 359) summarises the difference clearly: ‘dialogic presupposes that 
meaning arises only in the context of difference, whereas dialectic 
presupposes that differences are contradictions leading to a movement 
of overcoming.’. While I recognise the historical use of dialectics as a 
notion, here, and in terms of human interactions and development, 
dialogue and dialogics are much more appropriate. It seems to me that 
dialect connotes the struggle for a material objective difference (and, 
of course, it was used very persuasively as such by Marx). However, 
perhaps with Moscovici (Moscovici & Duveen, 2000, pp. 49–54), 
who held that psychologically, the objectification, the ‘materialization 
of an abstraction is one of the most mysterious features of thought and 
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speech. Political and intellectual authorities, of every kind, exploit it 
to subdue the masses.’ (ibid p 49). This demystification is also 
reductive and dehumanising (albeit in ways that we can understand 
but not necessarily accept as ‘reality’). Thus, as Moscovici also said 
(ibid p. 52). ‘Don’t we objectify precisely so as to forget that a 
creation, a material construct is the product of our own activity, that 
something is also someone?’ 
17 MP Diane Abbott’s account of her treatment in public and in private is 
an example of the hatred, degradation and vilification of her person, 
identity and representation. In an article in the Guardian, Abbott 
(2017) provides examples the abuse she has received, and goes on to 
say, ‘The point of this article is not, however, how I am treated as an 
individual. In 30 years in politics I have never complained about that. 
But I went into politics to create space for women and other groups 
who have historically been treated unfairly. Once, the pushback was 
against the actual arguments for equality and social justice. Now the 
pushback is the politics of personal destruction. This is doubly 
effective for opponents of social progress. Not only does it tend to 
marginalise the female “offender”, but other women look at how those 
of us in the public space are treated and think twice about speaking 
up publicly, let alone getting involved in political activity’. This makes 
it very clear that the hegemony of white males is very much alive and 
kicking. 
18 Any definable collection of objects can be labelled as ‘the set of those 
objects’. There is then a set, R, that is the set of all sets that are not 
members of themselves. But, if R is not a member of itself then, by 
definition it should contain itself. In that case it contradicts itself by 
not being the set of all sets that are not members of itself. More briefly 
– and simply – this was rephrased (by Russell) as follows: ‘There is a 
barber who shaves all those, and only those, who do not shave 
themselves. The question then is, does this barber shave himself?’ 
19 Amongst the more horrific examples are the treatment of women and 
children in ‘concentration camps’ in South Africa during the Boer 
Wars, the genocide of Jews, Gypsies, Communists and others in Nazi 
Germany, the Cambodian genocide during the Khymer Rouge regime 
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in the 1970s, the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, the killing of 
more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in 1995, the mass slaughter of 
civilians in Syria in 2014–5, and, in 2017, the violence against 
Muslims in Rohingya, Myanmar. One has to ask: why does history 
keep repeating itself so cruelly? 
20 The reporter apparently asked a member of Martin Luther King’s 
congregation “When our leader (John F Kennedy) was killed . . . his 
widow held us together. Who’s going to control your people?” 
21 www.janeelliott.com/ retrieved 2/3/2017; There is also a sizeable 
research literature confirming that teachers’ positive (Pygmalion) or 
negative (Golem) expectations may have significant effects on 
children’s performance (see, for instance Jussim & Harber, 2005; 
Madon, Jussim, & Eccles, 1997; Rubie-Davies, Hattie, & Hamilton, 
2006). Of concern is that there is evidence to indicate that negative 
expectations are more liable to be evoked in teachers by certain 
groups, especially children from ethnic minorities and those with 
some forms of additional special needs. 
22 Basing her thinking on prayer used by Sioux people (‘“Oh great spirit, 
keep me from ever judging a man until I have walked in his 
moccasins’”), Jane wanted her 3rd grade, all white children to have an 
experience of walking in the moccasins of people of colour for a day. 
23 This is conceptually and developmentally important. As John 
Macmurray (2012, pp. 666–667) said about the development of 
humanity, phylogenetically and ontogenetically, and in relation to 
what he saw as the business of education: ‘A child is born human; but 
this humanity consists in being without instincts, totally dependent, in 
an environment which is not natural, but the product of human 
artifice. He can survive only by being cared for. He can do nothing – 
just nothing – to help himself. He has to learn everything – to see, to 
move about, to walk, to speak: and while he is learning these basic 
elements of humanity, his human life consists in his relation to those 
who care for him – who feel for him, think and plan for him, act for 
him. This dependence on others is his life – yet to be human he must 
reach beyond it, not to independence, but to an interdependence in 
which he can give as well as receive. 
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‘Thus his humanity consists in learning to be human: and since it can take 
place only within his relation to others who care for him, the learning 
is also a “’being taught”’. To this we must add that the process of his 
education, like all human activities, is not matter of fact but of 
intention, and not determinate but problematical. Both he and his 
teachers must intend each step in the process. It will not happen of 
itself.’.’ 
24 Learned helplessness was first studied by Martin Seligman in the 1960s. 
In his experiments (initially involving dogs but later with human 
participants), Seligman showed that participants who learned that it 
was not possible to ‘turn off’ an unpleasant sensation (electric shocks 
for the dogs, loud noise for humans) became depressed and listless, 
and did not try to escape; whereas others who discovered that they 
could exercise control (turn off the electricity or noise) were 
unaffected by their experiences. See Maier and Seligman (1976) for 
accounts of the first experiments and resultant theory. 
25 (Brewer, 1991, p. 477). Paolini et al. have also suggested that there is a 
basic human motivation to ‘expand the self in order to increase one’s 
general self-efficacy,’ (Paolini, Wright, Dys-Steenbergen, & Favara, 
2016, p. 451). While I disagree with their conceptualisation of self-
efficacy, and am not entirely convinced that this constitutes a 
fundamental motivation for humankind, I am nonetheless intrigued by 
their hypothesis that an intrapersonal level this might be a cause of 
seeking adventurous and challenging experience; and that at an 
interpersonal level, this could cause one to form close interpersonal 
relationships with others, with a premium placed on seeking close 
relationships with dissimilar others. (ibid p. 452). 
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